An Empirical Evaluation of the Determinants of Executive Perksat S and P 500 Firms
Published: 2017
Author(s) Name: Andrew Carrothers |
Author(s) Affiliation: Professor of Finance, School of Business, University of Prince Edward Island, Canada.
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Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of executive
perks at S&P 500 firms using manually collected panel data. CEOs receive perks
more frequently and at higher levels than other named executive officers
(NEOs). In general, S&P 500 firms with larger growth opportunities, realized
growth, stock returns, and return on assets are less likely to provide perks and
provide lower levels of perks when they do. Firms with powerful CEOs are more
likely to provide perks. Firm size and executive monetary compensation are the
most influential determinants of the value of perks. Overall, tenure and gender
do not impact the likelihood or value of perk compensation at S&P 500
companies.
Keywords: perquisites, executive compensation, competitive market, private benefits
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